Choosing principles over politics may have led to Jimmy Carter’s fate as a one-term president, but it also distinguished him as one of the most admirable figures to occupy the Oval Office.
On November 4, 1980, Carter became the second Democratic incumbent in U.S. history to lose re-election, garnering only 49 Electoral College votes compared to Ronald Reagan’s 489 and trailing the popular vote by nearly 10 percentage points.
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Reagan’s decisive victory was labeled the “Reagan Revolution” by conservatives, who viewed it as a clear repudiation of Carter and his administration.
Republicans contend that the American public craved outstanding change; however, the political climate just weeks before the election appeared uncertain. With a struggling economy and escalating inflation exacerbated by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, polls indicated a tight race between Carter and Reagan right before Election Day.
Despite his challenges, Carter had two essential advantages: he was the incumbent president and presented himself as a moderate candidate who could appeal to the center.
In the eyes of many Americans in 1980, Reagan seemed like a fringe figure on the far right of the Republican Party, which raised concerns about his potential impact on the country’s social fabric. One of Reagan’s hurdles as a candidate was to alleviate these apprehensions, a task he did not always manage well.
For instance, he angered Southern voters on Labor Day by inaccurately claiming that Carter had initiated his campaign “down in the city that gave birth to and is the parent body of the Ku Klux Klan.”
Additionally, during a visit to Steubenville, Ohio, Reagan made an outlandish statement about trees being a major source of pollution, provoking students at Claremont Colleges to greet him with a sign from an oak tree that read, “Cut me down before I kill again.”
As the election neared, internal polling conducted by Carter’s strategist, Pat Caddell, revealed that the race was nearly even between him and Reagan. On that day, Carter noted in his White House diary that “Pat thinks the trend is in our direction, and CBS pollsters apparently agree. We are almost exactly even with Reagan.”
However, within a mere 24 hours, Caddell’s updated survey indicated a drastic decline in Carter’s support, granting Reagan a lead of 8 to 10 points—a margin that would persist through to Election Day.
What led to Carter’s sudden decline in support just before the election?
The pivotal issue of the campaign was the plight of 52 hostages taken in Iran since they were seized by revolutionary students in November 1979. After a failed rescue attempt that resulted in the deaths of eight U.S. servicemen in the Iranian desert, Carter dedicated his efforts to negotiating their release.
As the election approached, Republicans expressed concern that any progress in the hostage situation could secure a victory for the president. On the morning of November 2, hope flickered for Carter as it seemed he might find a breakthrough.
Stuart Eizenstat, Carter’s chief domestic policy adviser, was part of the president’s campaign team in the Midwest when he received a wake-up call at 4:21 a.m. revealing that Iran had made a new proposal.
The Iranian parliament had voted to approve conditions for the hostages’ release, which included returning frozen Iranian assets and a commitment from the U.S. not to interfere in Iran’s internal matters. Despite some advisors urging Carter to remain on the campaign trail, he rushed back to Washington to determine a response.
Eizenstat recalled, “The fate of the hostages and of the thirty-ninth president hung in the balance,” as Carter met with his team at the White House. “No one… failed to realize the gravity of the president’s predicament.”
After assessing the situation, Carter and his advisors deemed the Iranian terms too demanding and unsuitable for acceptance in their current state. Rather than outright reject the proposal, the president intended to acknowledge it as a basis for further negotiations and planned a live television address to communicate his response to the public.
In his diary, Carter wrote about drafting a statement that praised the proposal as a constructive development while asserting that he would not allow timing to influence his decision. However, he did not disclose that he had engaged in a contentious discussion with his advisors regarding the message he was about to deliver.
Carter’s chief strategist, Hamilton Jordan, alongside press secretary Jody Powell, media advisor Gerald Rafshoon, and Eizenstat, believed that the president had a powerful opportunity to leverage the hostage crisis to his political advantage and needed to persuade him to take decisive action.
Despite the discontent among voters regarding Carter’s management of the hostage crisis, the animosity directed at the Iranian regime, which had held U.S. civilians for more than a year, was even stronger. The president’s advisors felt that he could turn the televised address into a political asset by adopting a more assertive stance.
Eizenstat and his colleagues urged Carter to adopt a combative tone toward Iran, suggesting, “Blast the hell out of the Iranians for trying to interfere with our election… you can turn a lemon into lemonade.”
In his memoir about Carter’s presidency, Eizenstat noted that Rafshoon went further, insisting, “I’d tell them to go [f—k] themselves.” Despite these appeals, Carter remained steadfast in his position. He prioritized the safety of the hostages over a more aggressive political approach.
Carter’s press secretary Rafshoon noted, “He was… concerned that our rhetoric would jeopardize the safety of the hostages and the hostages came first before his re-election.”
Defying his advisors, Carter delivered a restrained and somewhat meandering three-minute address that underscored his apparent inability to resolve the hostage crisis at a critical juncture in his campaign. “He didn’t have the right political instinct at the right time,” lamented Eizenstat.
The aftermath of that announcement marked a sharp decline in Carter’s support, as noted by biographer Julian Zelizer: “After that announcement, Carter’s support really starts to plummet.”
Faced with immense stakes, Carter chose to follow his principles, which finally worked against him politically. According to Carter aide Greg Schneiders, “He had core beliefs, core principles, and values that he thought were what the country needed… he would do it even if it meant the end of his political career.”
Despite the frustration of his advisors, many who knew Carter held his leadership in high regard. Rafshoon expressed, “I would like to have won the election; it would have meant a lot to the country,” adding that “the thing I love about President Carter, he always put what’s right and moral above politics… and in retrospect, you wouldn’t have wanted to change it.”
Carter’s decision was vindicated in a crucial way. Thanks to his cautious diplomacy, just minutes after leaving the White House, all the hostages returned home safely. While he may have lost the election, he achieved his higher objective of securing their release for the American people.
