Recent efforts have emerged to reduce tensions from a military standoff between China and India along their mountainous frontier. Triggered in 2020 by China’s covert encroachments on the icy borderlands of India’s Ladakh region, this standoff has led to military buildups and sporadic clashes across the Himalayas.
The meeting on October 23 between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, held during a BRICS summit, underscored both nations’ desire to enhance their bilateral relations.
An agreement was made to take reciprocal actions aimed at diffusing the military tensions and maintaining peace along their contested border, recognized as one of the longest land borders globally.
Can a thaw in the deep-seated animosity between these two countries mitigate the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry that is pivotal to Asian geopolitics? The roots of the current tensions trace back to the early 1950s, when China positioned itself as a neighbor to India by taking control of the formerly autonomous Tibet region.
This annexation served as a catalyst for the Sino-Indian border war in 1962. Although diplomatic ties were restored after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, enduring mutual suspicion and hostility have persisted despite attempts to establish a stable coexistence.
India is now grappling with the repercussions of Modi’s initial strategy to court China. The surprise territorial encroachments by China in 2020 occurred while India was engaged in one of the world’s strictest lockdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
When Modi took office in 2014, he was a newcomer to foreign policy. His ambition to reset relations with Beijing stemmed from the hope of undermining China’s strategic alliance with Pakistan. Both China and Pakistan are seen as revisionist states, with Pakistan additionally leveraging cross-border terrorism as a means of foreign policy.
The enduring China-Pakistan partnership has imposed security challenges for India, raising concerns about the possibility of a two-front war. Through what is known as a “defensive wedge strategy,” India has long sought to disrupt this Sino-Pakistan alliance but has had little success.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the first prime minister from Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, made attempts to establish a rapport with Pakistan, famously traveling there by bus in 1999. Conversely, Modi concentrated on fostering ties with China after assuming office, being the first world leader to host Xi and facilitating Chinese business operations in India by removing the country from the “country of concern” list.
Modi’s peace overtures, however, backfired dramatically. During Xi’s visit to India in 2014, an unprecedented Chinese military incursion into Indian territory occurred, which was succeeded by an escalated military confrontation on the Doklam Plateau in 2017, near the Bhutan-Tibet-India trijunction.
The 2020 encroachments occurred despite 18 meetings between Modi and Xi during the previous five years. Following a tumultuous relationship with China, Modi has begun to adopt a more pragmatic approach in his policies, placing greater emphasis on military modernization and enhancing border defenses.
The military standoff has illustrated India’s willingness to confront China, challenging its capabilities in a manner that no other nation has managed in this century. Xi miscalculated, believing that China could impose a new status quo on India without facing substantial military opposition.
This standoff has also revealed Xi’s strategic shortsightedness, turning what was once a conciliatory relationship with India into one marked by hostility, as India now appears resolute in opposing a Sinocentric Asia. While Xi accuses the U.S. of seeking to contain and encircle China, antagonizing its largest neighbor was an unwise move.
Xi’s assertive policies have similarly prompted major changes in the strategic approaches of other leading Indo-Pacific nations. Japan has committed to doubling its defense spending by 2027, effectively abandoning its postwar pacifism, while Australia has shifted from a cautious stance to joining the U.S.-led AUKUS alliance aimed against China.
The current attempts by China and India to alleviate tensions and withdraw troops from their shared frontier are influenced by various geopolitical factors. India’s motivation includes the desire to enhance its foreign policy flexibility as its previously strong strategic partnership with the U.S. shows signs of strain, despite President Biden recognizing it as one of the most consequential relationships globally.
On the other hand, China faces mounting resistance from the West against its expansionist policies. With its economy struggling, China is encountering long-term growth challenges, such as a declining and rapidly aging population alongside decreasing productivity growth.
However, India boasts one of the world’s youngest populations, with a median age of 28.4, positioning itself to benefit from a demographic dividend. While India’s economy remains smaller than China’s, it is currently growing at a faster rate than any other economy.
China’s People’s Liberation Army primarily depends on conscripts, who volunteer for two years of service starting at age 18, whereas India’s military is an all-volunteer force recognized as the most experienced in hybrid mountain warfare.
However, India’s advantages in the challenging Himalayan terrain may be offset by China’s superior aerial capabilities, including its missile technology. In this situation, both Xi and Modi are motivated to ease the Himalayan military crisis while maintaining their respective images.
Although reducing tensions along the border is sensible for both leaders, it is unlikely that the Sino-Indian rivalry will diminish. In fact, this rivalry is poised to play a crucial role in shaping both the Asian and global balance of power.
