The growing competition for influence in Latin America highlights the urgency for the United States to shift its attention toward fostering economic growth, combating corruption, and dismantling organized crime. These efforts could lead to reduced migration, decreased violence, and an improved quality of life throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Addressing these objectives demands tackling emerging challenges tied to criminal networks. While traditional insurgencies in Latin America have largely transitioned into political parties, disbanded, or vanished, some remnants have evolved into formidable criminal entities. These groups often cloak themselves in outdated communist ideologies to justify their expansive illegal operations.
Modern cartels and criminal organizations have prioritized profitability, relying heavily on corruption to sustain their activities. Allegations of illicit campaign financing and connections to transnational crime have undermined democratic governments in the region. This erosion of transparency during electoral processes and the exposure to external interference jeopardize the credibility of Latin American states.
The region has experienced a surge in criminal organizations’ influence. Mexican cartels, with an estimated 175,000 members, operate in every Mexican state, engaging in drug and human trafficking, extortion, prostitution, and oil theft while escalating violence against civilians and authorities.
Similarly, Colombian armed groups have grown since the 2016 peace accord, with factions like the ELN, FARC dissidents, and the Clan del Golfo expanding their reach and intensifying their involvement in drug trade, illegal mining, and extortion.
Venezuela serves as a sanctuary for such groups, while Ecuador acts as a primary conduit for narcotics leaving the continent. Even Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay face related challenges.
The methods of organized crime have shifted, focusing less on regime change and more on maximizing profits. These groups work to avoid attention while maintaining territorial dominance, often achieving their aims through widespread corruption.
Resources are strategically allocated to influence political campaigns, ensuring protection at local levels and favorable policies from higher echelons. This strategy has proven effective, with allegations of corruption and illegal campaign funding tainting numerous governments across the region.
In Mexico, former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s “hugs, not bullets” policy enabled cartel expansion and growth in the fentanyl trade. Current President Claudia Sheinbaum has maintained a stance against reinstating military action, even as violence escalates.
In Honduras, President Xiomara Castro has faced scrutiny for evidence tying her brother to drug traffickers during her earlier presidential campaign. Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro remains closely linked to criminal networks, while Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro has been accused of benefiting from illegal campaign financing connected to drug traffickers.
These associations between criminal organizations and political figures have severely strained institutional integrity, paralyzing democratic processes and threatening regional stability.
Latin America’s importance on the global stage has grown, with foreign powers capitalizing on vulnerabilities created by corruption and criminal activity. Many governments, originating as armed insurgencies, have maintained ties to China and Russia.
The destabilizing effects of organized crime have presented new opportunities for external powers to exert influence, often ignoring or benefiting from these illicit connections.
Anti-Western nations have increased their presence in the region through initiatives like China’s Belt and Road projects, infrastructure investments, and substantial oil imports from Venezuela.
Russia, on the other hand, has bolstered corrupt regimes by providing military aid and deploying operatives such as the Wagner Group to suppress dissent during contested elections in Venezuela.
Foreign proxies have also been linked to illicit activities in Latin America. Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, manages networks for drug trafficking and smuggling to fund operations in the Middle East.
Chinese entities facilitate money laundering and export chemical precursors for drug production, while also ignoring contraband through their trading companies. Although direct links between these governments and criminal organizations remain unclear, evidence suggests indirect involvement.
A declining faith in democracy has left the region increasingly susceptible to foreign manipulation. To counteract this trend, the incoming Trump administration must intensify U.S. engagement in Latin America.
Appointing figures like Sen. Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Ambassador Chris Landau as his deputy reflects an early commitment to addressing these challenges.
The U.S. must take decisive actions to protect its interests, uphold democratic values, and confront corruption and criminal connections within regional governments. This approach requires balancing pragmatic strategies with efforts to support the people of Latin America, ensuring stability, security, and prosperity across the hemisphere.
Juan Carlos Pinzón, a former Colombian Minister of Defense and two-time ambassador to the U.S., currently serves as a visiting professor at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs. Gerardo Caneva, his chief of staff, is an expert in political risk analysis.
