The recent end-of-year press conference held by Vladimir Putin predominantly served as a platform for self-congratulation, yet it revealed alarming insights into the extent of depravity and detachment that characterizes the Russian leader’s perspective.
During this event, a banner from the 155th Marine Brigade of the Pacific Fleet was prominently displayed. Putin expressed gratitude towards the unit, stating, “this banner represents all the combat banners of our soldiers, who are fighting for Russia, for the Motherland, along the entire line of contact.”
However, it is crucial to note that the 155th Marine Brigade has been implicated in war crimes, having been responsible for the brutal killings of numerous Ukrainian civilians in the early days of the invasion, specifically in the cities of Bucha, Irpin, and Hostomel.
By endorsing this unit, Putin was effectively condoning its actions, thereby extending his approval to the genocidal conduct of the Russian military. This gesture also communicated to Western nations that he intends to continue utilizing genocide as a tactic in warfare, whether against Ukraine, Finland, the Baltic states, or Poland.
Meanwhile, he appeared unconcerned about being labeled a war criminal, challenging any Russians with a sense of morality to speak out against the complicity he demands from the entire nation.
In an unsettling affirmation of his belief in the Russian populace’s thirst for violence, Putin remarked, “You know, when everything with us is calm, measured, and stable, we get bored. Stagnation. We want action.
As soon as the action starts, everything starts whistling past our temples: both seconds and bullets. Unfortunately, bullets are also whistling now. Yes, we are scared, ‘horror-horror.’ Well, ‘horror.’ But not ‘horror-horror-horror.’”
Interpreting this repetitive invocation of “horror” provides insight into his perception of his people’s relationship with violence; it suggests that while they may experience some fear, it is not overwhelming. Russians seem to take a certain pleasure in the sound of gunfire, which, as implied by his praise of the 155th Brigade, is directed at innocent Ukrainian civilians.
Putin further stated, “I believe that Russia has become stronger in the past two or three years. Why? Because we are becoming a truly sovereign country, and we barely depend on anybody. … [Russia] has grown stronger and become a truly sovereign state, and we will make decisions without looking at other people’s opinions, only with our national interests in mind.”
He references what he perceives as a robust economy and military. However, both have diminished over the past three years, and few would agree with his assertion of their strength.
His claim that the economy and military “barely depend on anybody” is accurate; Russia has indeed become more isolated and less reliant on external influences. Yet, a lack of dependence does not equate to strength.
While Putin may argue that sovereignty has increased, he neglects to mention that this newfound independence has come at the cost of Russia’s previous engagement with the global economy and international affairs, replacing it with a reliance on China and North Korea. In reality, one could argue that Russia’s sovereignty has diminished during this period.
Is Putin experiencing a delusion? Perhaps not. For the past 25 years, he has aligned his identity with that of Russia. As the embodiment of the Russian state, he can logically assert that any increase in his dictatorial powers since the war’s onset correlates with a rise in Russia’s status.
What is particularly alarming is his seemingly genuine belief that he and the country are synonymous. Even more concerning is that many Russians appear to share this viewpoint.
Towards the end of the press conference, there was a particularly revealing moment when Putin was asked whether he would have acted differently in February 2022. His response warrants careful reading to discern the omissions:
“If it were possible to look at the situation in 2022, knowing what’s happening now, what would I think? That such a decision, which was made at the beginning of 2022, should have been made earlier… “Knowing this, it was necessary to simply start preparing for these events, including the Special Military Operation.
After all, the Crimean events, they were simply spontaneous, and we also started the events of 2022 without any special preparation for them. But why did we start? Because it was no longer possible to stand still and endure, and wait for the situation to worsen for us…
“The Kyiv authorities announced that they would not implement the Minsk agreements. They said so directly, declared their claims to some weapons of mass destruction. We saw that we were deceived about the Minsk agreements; the war and slaughter, the destruction of people in the Donbas have been going on for eight years…
“And what’s more, we saw that the military development of these territories has begun, with the parallel destruction of everything connected with Russia. It was no longer possible to remain in the state we were in. They forced us to take these actions.”
What is conspicuously absent from this narrative is any reference to NATO and its alleged intentions to incorporate Ukraine. Instead, Putin places blame entirely on the actions and failures of the Ukrainian government.
Regardless of one’s stance on his analysis, it is evident that he has severely undermined the credibility of the “NATO threat” argument among uninformed policymakers and analysts.
Such conclusions should not come as a shock. Putin is remaining true to his nature; indeed, he seems to take pride in being a warmonger and perpetrator of genocide. He thrives in environments of death and destruction, and he appears to believe that his fellow Russians share this inclination.
Negotiations with Putin will not center around achieving peace or ending conflict; rather, they will revolve around the timing and magnitude of genocide and warfare.
Alexander J. Motyl serves as a political science professor at Rutgers University-Newark. With expertise in Ukraine, Russia, and the former USSR, along with a focus on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he has authored ten nonfiction books, including “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”
